基于信号博弈的“显隐结合”战略威慑分析
CSTR:
作者:
作者单位:

作者简介:

通讯作者:

中图分类号:

基金项目:


Analysis of Strategy Deterrence Combining with Evident and Recessive Ways Based on Signal Game Theory
Author:
Affiliation:

Fund Project:

  • 摘要
  • |
  • 图/表
  • |
  • 访问统计
  • |
  • 参考文献
  • |
  • 相似文献
  • |
  • 引证文献
  • |
  • 资源附件
  • |
  • 文章评论
    摘要:

    为了解释 “显隐结合”战略威慑的独特功用,为战略威慑运用提供决策支持,运用信号博弈原理分析了“显隐结合”战略威慑成败机理。提出了不完全信息动态博弈分析框架,指出威慑方的威慑行动取得成功,必须使自己作为强硬类型的概率大于转折概率,而“显隐结合”的方式能够改变威慑方的先验概率,使威慑由失败转为成功变得可能。结论表明:通过提高威慑实力,坚定战略威慑决心,发出分离信号和注重在改变对手的认知,能够较好地达到战略威慑目的。

    Abstract:

    In order to explain the function of the strategy deterrence combining with evident and recessive ways, provide decision support for the strategy deterrence application, the mechanism of this strategy deterrence was studied with the signal game theory. The analysis framework based on incomplete information dynamic game was put forward, point out that that when the probability of the strong type was bigger than transmit probability, the deterrence move may be successful. And the evident and recessive ways can change the prior probability, the successful deterrence may come true. The results show that, by improving deterrence power, insisting on strategy deterrence determination, generate separation signal and change the opponent cognition, and realize the strategy deterrence.

    参考文献
    相似文献
    引证文献
引用本文

张小娟.基于信号博弈的“显隐结合”战略威慑分析[J].,2018,37(02).

复制
分享
文章指标
  • 点击次数:
  • 下载次数:
  • HTML阅读次数:
  • 引用次数:
历史
  • 收稿日期:2017-11-13
  • 最后修改日期:2017-12-10
  • 录用日期:
  • 在线发布日期: 2018-04-20
  • 出版日期:
文章二维码